Starting from the failure of the R&D-patents traditional relationship, when time-series and/or within industry dimensions are included in the empirical analysis, the present work tries to contribute to the empirical literature from two directions. Firstly, it performs a Granger causality test based on the theoretical presumption of a reverse patents→R&D link as an explanation for the failure of the traditional relationship. Secondly, assuming the reverse patents-R&D causality, we test and interpret the lag structure of such a relationship which shows the effective patent life that firms can expect within the two Schumpeterian patterns of innovations they belong to. In the light of the effective patent life, we offer a further explanation of innovation persistence which overturns the findings of the existing literature on persistence.
Introduction
R&D activity is the basis for the production of innovation that, in its turn, drives economic growth.
The innovative process is made up of R&D investments, the input of the process, and the innovation, the output. The most common measure of the innovation output is the number of patents. The traditional direction of causality in the R&D-patents relationship (hereafter R&D→patents) assumes that patents are the natural output of the R&D activity in the sense that more investment in R&D will result in more innovations and patenting (Jaffe, 1986; Griliches, 1990) . The empirical literature, performed on cross-sectional data, confirmed a strong and highly significant (contemporaneous) correlation between R&D inputs and different patent measures across firms: the greater the R&D investments, the greater the patents (Pakes and Griliches 1980; Hall et al. 1986; Griliches 1988; Beneito 2006) .
Recent theoretical and empirical papers drawn attention to some drawbacks in the R&D-patents traditional relationship. New theoretical approaches have shown that, even if in the 1990s there was an increase in patent applications, the tendency to extend patent protections may be counterproductive in terms of R&D investments (Shapiro 2001; Hunt 2006; Bessen and Hunt 2007) . From an empirical point of view, when time-series and/or within industry dimensions are included in the empirical analysis, the positive correlation between R&D and patents almost vanishes (Hall et al. 1986; Hausman et al. 1984; Czarnitzki et al. 2009 ). Some explanations have been advanced in order to justify the failure of the R&D→patents causality direction, in terms of the weaker orientation towards patent protection of some industries (Levin et al. 1987) as well as of patent data being "wrong" indicators of innovative activity (Griliches 1990 ).
We argue that the traditional R&D→patents fail if a reverse causality in the R&D-patents relationship holds: patent applications are made at an early point in the development process and most of the R&D expenditures occur after the patent applications. Only recently the research in this field has started to explore the reverse causality in the R&D-patents relationship (hereafter patents→R&D). If patents are considered as a policy instrument aimed at fostering and stimulating R&D investment and innovation, the analysis of patents→R&D becomes of utmost importance (Encaoua et al. 2006) . The mainstream of theoretical literature concerning the reverse causality in the patent-R&D relationship assumes a positive correlation. Empirical studies lack corroboration in this conclusion: they tend to be unclear or not in favour of the positive correlation assumption.
The aim of this work is twofold: firstly, it tries to enrich the empirical literature based on the theoretical assumption of a reverse patent→R&D link. Differently from the few foregoing empirical studies, we do not impose the reverse causality relationship between patent and R&D but we perform a Granger causality test whose results corroborate the possibility that a reverse causality in the patent-R&D relationship may exist. As it turns out, the Granger causality test has confirmed that past values of patents contain the information that is relevant for forecasting R&D:, in the Granger sense, patents cause R&D expenditure. Therefore, we can assume that the productivity of the R&D activity, in terms of the share of inventions firms are willing to patent, occurs at an early stage of the innovation process, thus driving up the future timing and intensity of the R&D expenditure.
Secondly, we argue that the lag structure of the reverse causality in the patents and R&D relationship offers a new explanation of the innovation persistence, in terms of Schumpeterian patterns of innovations, that overturns the findings of the existing literature on this subject. Going into more detail, we hypothesize that the lag structure of the reverse causality differs in the two Schumpeterian patterns leading to different interpretations of the innovation persistence. As a matter of fact, the traditional approach states that the "creative accumulation" (as in Schumpeter Mark II) leads to innovation persistence, while the "creative destruction" (as in Schumpeter Mark I) is used to explain the absence of persistence in innovation activities. Even though firms in different industries of the economy face a distinct set of opportunities, constraints and conditions, we argue that those industry-specific characteristics play a fundamental role in explaining how and when patents stimulate R&D activity for firms. In the light of this fact, according to the characteristics of the technological regimes (Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II) firms belong to, we can interpret the lag structure in the patents→R&D relationship. We may expect that in sectors characterized by a high appropriability of innovations, high barriers to entry and the dominance of large established firms (the Schumpeter Mark II), firms which decide to patent their innovations are more likely to believe that the effective patent life (the expected time until a patented product is replaced on the market) will be long (O'Donoghue et al. 1998) . Therefore, they tend to enjoy the monopoly rent patent give them and postpone the R&D activity until the moment that this monopoly rent is expected to expire. In other words, they do not persist in their R&D investment.
On the contrary, in sectors with opposite characteristics (the Schumpeter Mark I), firms believing in a shorter effective patent life may tend to persist in the innovative effort. Hence, the cause of the innovation persistence on R&D, as discussed above, refers to and depends on the effective patent life which is then defined by the lag structure in the patents→R&D relationship.
Our empirical analysis is conducted at the micro level on an original dataset of 6490 Italian firms surveyed from 1998 to 2004. We have specified and estimated a log-linear dynamic regression model of the (log of) R&D expenditure on the number of patent applications of firms in the two Schumpeterian patterns.
The estimation results have confirmed our predictions. They have shown the positive and statistically significant coefficient of one year lagged dependent variable (R&D effort) as well as the positive and statistically significant contemporaneous coefficient of the patent applications in Schumpeter Mark I. It implies that there is persistence in the R&D expenditure and such persistence is path dependent since other factors, especially the patenting activity we are interested in, affect the innovation process. However, in Schumpeter Mark II, neither the lagged dependent variable coefficients nor the patent applications coefficients (contemporaneous and up to two years lagged) are significant, indicating the absence of persistence due to the longer effective patent life firms expect in this pattern (as the estimated lag structure in the patents→R&D showed). Unfortunately, despite the width of the cross-sectional dimension of the panel, the lack of a reasonable time lag between patents and R&D expenditure may challenge the validity of our results in Schumpeter Mark II. We try to give robustness to the analysis by showing that, controlling for lots of aspects affecting the patent-R&D relationship, none of such controls grasps the variance of R&D expenditure for firms in Schumpeter Mark II.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature that provides the background and foundation for our study; section 3 describes the Schumpeterian patterns of innovations where our hypotheses will be tested; section 4 comprises the econometric specifications and results and section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
The literature
The main idea that we want to put forward in this paper, is that the lag structure of patent coefficients in the reverse causality between patents and R&D, affects the innovation persistence of R&D expenditure (in the two Schumpeterian regimes) through the effective patent life. Hence, there are two overlapping literatures: the patents-R&D relationship and the innovation persistence literature. In the following part we briefly summarize both types of literature in order to highlight the hypotheses that we are going to test.
Patents-R&D relationship literature
The traditional direction of causality in the R&D-patents relationship assumes that patents are the natural output of R&D activity, meaning that more investment in R&D will result in more innovations and patenting (Jaffe 1986; Griliches 1990 ). The empirical literature confirmed this positive relationship (Pakes and Griliches 1980; Griliches 1988; Beneito 2006) . Several papers on cross-sectional data of firms, have estimated the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D to be around 1 (Hausman et al. 1984; Jaffe 1986; Duguet and Kabla 1998; Crepon et al. 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999; Cincera 1997) . Hall et al. (1986) There are two drawbacks in the traditional direction of causality in the R&D→patent. Firstly, if a time-series dimension is included in the analysis, the positive correlation between R&D and patent almost vanishes: the estimated parameters of the reaction of patents to changes in R&D expenditures (over years) fall sharply and become less significant (Hall et al. 1986; Hausman et al.1984; Czarnitzki et al. 2009 ). Secondly, the above correlation becomes almost absent when the analysis is at the industry level. Levin et al. (1987) , in justifying the previous evidence, says that, despite of some industries have a high propensity to patent, they patent much fewer than other industries with a weaker orientation towards patent protection. Griliches (1990) offers two kinds of explanations for the noticeable weakness in the estimated R&D→patent elasticity. One is that patent data are not a "right" indicator of innovative activity because they reflect a propensity behaviour, rather than innovation performance or research productivity.
2 The other concerns patent series which are very random because they vary greatly in their value, with most patents having a low value and only a few patents having a very high value.
3
In the light of the fact that the empirical evidence has shown the failure of the R&D→patents relationship while taking into account within-industry and/or time-series dimensions, we argue that the undisputed link between patents and R&D may be reversed: patents aim at stimulating the R&D investment; patents encourage investment in R&D and thus the production of knowledge and innovation.
The reverse causality link between patents and R&D was first examined by Nordhaus (1969) . He asserted that the extent of patent protection, enhancing the expected return on an innovation, leads to incentivize the R&D investments.
Theoretically, the expectations of the signs of such a reverse causality relationship are twofold.
Intuitively, the broader the patent scope or the longer the patent length, the greater the R&D effort is (Denicolo 1996) . But, considering the nature of innovations (sequential or independent, complementary or isolated) the results may change ( Even if theoretical literature has found justifications and conditions under which the reverse causality in the patent→R&D relationship holds, empirical works lack in confirming either a positive or a negative result. Pakes (1985) suggests a reverse Granger-causality from patents to R&D on the grounds that patents could contain information on technological opportunity that would lead to R&D in the future. Neither Pakes (1985) nor Hall et al. (1986) found evidence of causality in this direction. Using two successive four-year apart innovation survey data, Van Ophem et al. (2002) found little evidence of a Granger-causality from R&D to patents but clear-cut evidence of a causality in the opposite direction. The empirical study of Kortum and Lerner (1999) (Kingston 2001) . The first and, to our knowledge, the only empirical work estimating the reverse causality relationship R&D-patents is that of Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) . They both ask if an expansion of a patent's scope induces more R&D effort.
Their econometric analysis on Japan's patent law reform concludes that there seems to be no evidence that the strengthening of a patent's scope leads to an increase in R&D spending.
Therefore, the failure of the traditional relationship and the support of the theoretical literature about the possibility of the reverse causality relationship (even if under specific conditions) allows us to put forward the hypothesis that a reverse causality patents→R&D may hold. The first part of this work is to corroborate that hypothesis through a Granger causality test over a sample of Italian firms belonging to various sectors of the economy.
Innovation persistence literature
The persistence of firms in innovative activities occurs when a firm which has innovated in one period innovates once again in the subsequent period. It is, therefore, linked to the success firms have in the research area Cefis and Orsenigo 2001) . Theoretical literature provides three explanations of the persistence of innovation at the firm level: 1) sunk cost: it is stressed that R&D decisions are subject to a long time horizon, and if a firm decides to take up R&D activities, it will incur start-up costs in building up an R&D department or hiring and training R&D staff. These fixed outlays, once made, are usually not recoverable and can therefore be considered as sunk costs (Sutton 1991; Manez Castillejo et al. 2004) . 5 This approach to innovation persistence implies that in order to build and maintain an R&D department, R&D expenditure must be regular; 2) financial constraints: they force firms to retain earning as a source of funds.
Therefore, as in the "success-breeds-success" processes (Nelson and Winter 1982) , innovative success yields profits that can be reinvested in R&D, thereby increasing the probability to innovate again; 3) learning-by-doing: knowledge that has previously been used to produce innovations can be used to produce current and even future innovations.
Those three causes of innovation persistence become relevant in the context of the two Schumpeterian patterns of innovations. Indeed, the studies on the persistence of innovation are motivated by testing the Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II hypotheses that is, authors authors tried to find out whether innovation activities are subject to "creative destruction" or According to such features, the traditional literature stated that in Schumpeter Mark I, the "creative destruction" explains the absence of persistence, whereas in Schumpeter Mark II, the existence of significant degrees of persistence contributes to generate the processes of "creative accumulation".
Empirical studies on the persistence of innovation is quite recent. This new area of research was opened by . Successive works provide mixed results about such persistence.
Most works that have focused on patenting data, identify weak elements of persistency. Using UK firms in the period , Geroski et al (1997 , found that only a minority of firms is persistently innovative; Cefis (2003) and Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) investigated, through the transition probability matrix, the probability that firms that have applied for a patent at time t-1 have a stronger probability of applying for a patent at time t+1 than firms that did not apply for a patent in the prior period having found little persistence; Latham and Le Bas (2006) show that innovation persistence is linked to the size and profitability of firms.
On the contrary, empirical analyses based on survey data find a stronger evidence of innovation persistence, but they stress that results are sensitive to the chosen indicator (Duguet and Monjon 2004) . Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2008) showed that both product and process innovations are strongly persistent; Peters (2009) Having touched on the two relevant theoretical and empirical types of literature, we can now introduce the second and the newest part of this work in which we advance the hypothesis that the lag structure of the reverse relationship between patents and R&D may offer a further explanation of the innovation persistence of R&D expenditure in terms of the effective patent life. We hypothesize that the effective patent life depends on the different characteristics of appropriability, the barriers to entry and the dominance of large established firms on markets and industrial sectors which are the features of the technological regimes in which these firms operate.
The kind of classification of sectors that we use is a relevant part of this work. A technological regime is defined as the technological environment in which innovative activities take place in each sector of the economy (Nelson and Winter 1982; Winter 1984 Winter , 2006 Malerba 2002) . The literature states that innovation process differs across sectors in terms of various dimensions (Pavitt 1984; Mowery and Nelson 1999; Malerba 2004) . The dimensions are: 1) Level of technological opportunities; 2) Appropriability conditions; 3) Cumulativeness conditions; 4) External sources of opportunities. 7 Those characteristics provide a set of opportunities and constraints for firms which shape their innovative activities (Cohen and Levin 1989; Malerba and Orsenigo 1995; Lee and Lim 2001) . suggested that the notion of technological regimes may be a fruitful concept for studying the different ways in which innovative activities are organized and industries evolve over time. They single out the two Schumpeterian patterns of innovations:
Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. Indeed, the patterns of innovations, originally pointed out by Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( , 1943 , were modeled on the properties of technological regimes. The high ease of entry in the market and the low concentration of innovative activity make the Relevant for our analysis is that the innovation activity of firms belonging to the same technological regime is homogeneous with respect to the four dimensions above (see Breschi et al. 2000) . In particular, one can observe almost the same behavior of the innovative activity of firms in the same pattern with respect to the appropriability conditions which essentially refers to patents. This aspect is the reason that explains why, in the empirical analysis on the persistence of innovation in terms of the relationship R&D-Patents, we decided to cluster sectors into Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. 8 With reference to the literature, we can also argue that the persistence of innovation is related to the characteristics of the technological regime in which the enterprise operates, but we propose a new explanation of such persistence that overturns the previous findings. In detail, the lag structure of the patent→R&D relationship, which is affected by the characteristics of the Schumpeterian patterns, is informative about the effective patent life that determines the persistence of innovation of firms. Indeed, in the Schumpeter Mark II regime, high cumulativeness and appropriability conditions create strong technological entry barriers for new innovators. This implies that R&D activity is made by well-established oligopolistic innovators, which may patent their innovations and enjoy the monopoly rent patent gives them; they expect a longer effective patent life and, therefore, they may postpone the successive R&D activity just before the monopoly rent expires. 9 As for the interpretation of the lag structure of the regression of patents on R&D expenditure, we should expect a negative/no contemporaneous and delayed (of at least 2-3 years, depending on the effective patent life) relation between them. The consequence of such a longer effective patent life is the absence of R&D effort persistence.
In a Schumpeter Mark I pattern, instead, low cumulativeness and appropriability conditions tend to facilitate the frequent entry of new innovative firms. In this highly competitive environment, the ability of firms to continuously innovate becomes a crucial factor. Given the expected shorter effective patent life, firms which decide to protect their innovation with patents, persist in their innovative effort. Therefore, according to this pattern, we expect a contemporaneous relationship between patents and R&D expenditure.
Data description
For the empirical analysis we have used an original dataset of about 6500 firms investing in R&D Information about the economic activity of firms is derived from firms' balance sheets.
Eliminato: ¶
The two most important variables in the empirical analysis are the number of patent applications and the R&D expenditure, both standardized by the number of employees in the R&D division. innovations. We have chosen to standardize R&D expenditure by the employees in R&D division since this measure reflects the overall resources that personnel in R&D use to develop new products and processes. 13 This variable expresses productivity better than others: we may expect that firms investing more in R&D expenditure per R&D employee should be more productive. This variable properly addresses the link between R&D and patents. Thus, this sample analisys seems to show that firms in SMI have patented more and invested in R&D less than firms in SMII.
Econometric specifications and results

Granger causality test
Most of the results in the R&D-patents traditional relationship do not take into account the issue of causality in the Granger sense. In recent years significant improvements in the econometric modeling of the Granger causality relationship have been made. Starting from the work of Granger (1969), a lot of studies offer new approaches for testing the Granger causality in panel data. 14 Relying on previous studies, we have attempted to assess the direction of the causality, in the Granger sense, for the R&D-patent relationship. Thus, we have carried out the Granger causality test on the relationship between firms' R&D investment and firms' patenting activity, using the sample of Italian firms (during the period 1998-2004) mentioned above.
For each firm i at time t we consider two variables: y it , that measures the R&D productivity (proxied by the ratio between R&D intramural expenditure and the employees in R&D activities at the firm level) and x it , that measures the number of patent applications of firms (over the employees in R&D division). The Granger causality test will answer the following question: is it R&D productivity that causes, in the Granger sense, patent applications or not? More generally, variable x is said to Granger cause variable y if, given the past values of y, past values of x are useful to predict y. This means that, in order to predict current values of the dependent variable, the relevant information is contained solely in the time dimension of the regressors.
Therefore, testing Granger causality implies to regress variable y on its own lagged values and on lagged values of x, and to test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the lagged values of x are jointly equal to zero. At this point, the choice of lags is important. We checked the order of the autoregressive process of the variables of interest: both are AR(2) processes. Firstly, the estimation of model (1) 15 will allow us to establish whether x it Granger causes y it :
(1)
where n is the number of lags (n=2), i is the number of firms in each year, t is time period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . According to Baltagi (2005) the random error term is made of an unobservable firm specific (µ i ), time specific (λ t ), and a random error term (ν it ) which represents measurement errors in the dependent variable and the omitted explanatory variables. It is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance. The firm and time specific effects, µ i and λ t , capture firms' heterogeneity and exogenous technological change respectively and are assumed to be independent of each other and of regressors.
If x it will Granger cause y it , the following null hypothesis must be rejected. If the null is not rejected, the estimate model (1) is the same as the estimate restricted model .
That is, past values of patents applications do not help to forecast R&D productivity.
At the same time, we will specify the same model as in (1) in order to study whether y it Granger
If R&D productivity will Granger cause patents, the following null hypothesis must be rejected.
In dealing with panel data analysis, the cross-sectional variation is a crucial issue; this type of variation may be addressed with a fixed effect model because it is captured by distinctive intercepts (Hsiao 1986; Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 1988) . This procedure is appropriate for panels with particularly short time dimensions (t<10). We take this aspect into account in the estimation techniques. Once models (1) and (2) have been estimated, we calculate a Wald statistic in order to assess the causality, as in Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012 
Innovation persistence estimation results
In order to check our hypothesis that patents→R&D relationship may offer a further explanation for innovation persistence in terms of Schumpeterian patterns, we have estimated the following loglinear dynamic panel data regression model (see for firm i at year t. log(R&D), the dependent variable, is the natural logarithm of the intramural expenditure in R&D activity and Patent is the number of patent applications of firms, both standardized by the number of employees in the R&D division. 18 The former, as explained above, is a measure of the R&D productivity, since it captures how much a firm invests in R&D per employees in the R&D division. Patent applications are a standard measure of patents; 19 for reasons of coherence, we also standardized patent applications by the R&D employees since this ratio reflects how many new products and processes have been developed by each R&D employee. γ, the auto-regression coefficient, represents our measure of persistence. We have also introduced contemporaneous and up to two lags of Patent; we cannot add further lags of patent applications because of the many missing values in the panel; increasing the number of lags should drastically reduce the number of observations, making inference impossible to do. 20 Equation (3) has been estimated by the Arellano-Bond technique. 21 We have performed the estimation on two Schumpeterian patterns of innovation, Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. 22 For each pattern we have introduced control variables in order to check the robustness of our hypothesis.
Control variables are:
• the natural logarithm of sales as a measure of the firm's size (ln(Sales));
• the ratio between employees in the R&D division and the total number of employees (in percentage), as a measure of the size of the firm's R&D division (R&D size); • the percentage of graduated employees in the R&D activities; this captures the level of education of the R&D employees (Education);
• two variables that control a firm's specific characteristics relative to: the financial structure (Leverage) and the efficiency (Labour cost).
There are no economic reasons that account for lags in the relationship between R&D investment and control variables, thus we have estimated them contemporaneously.
Following Antonelli (2008) and Antonelli et al. (2012) we can asses that the dynamic of the process might be non-ergodic, that is, an early and successful innovation may have long lasting consequences causing further innovations. Moreover, it must be investigated whether the early innovation is sufficient to produce long lasting consequences or whether effective strategies and events that have been taking place along the process do affect the persistence. In other words, the process may be past dependent and path dependent respectively. Table 9 in appendix shows the estimation results of equation (3) for the two Schumpeterian patterns of innovations. A crucial assumption for the validity of GMM is that the instruments are exogenous.
For that, in order to compute the Sargan test, we firstly estimate equation (3) in the homoskedastic case. 23 The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the over-identification restrictions are valid; we do not reject the null and the model is correctly specified. 24 In order to control for heteroskedasticity, every estimated equation in table 9 has robust standard errors. Each column is estimated with a calendar dummy variable in order to control for common shocks for a given year;
we do not show the coefficients of such dummies. We have also included dummies for the Italian regions that firms belong to in order to control for an investment localization effect: 25 it is reasonable to believe that firms decide to place their production in one region rather than in another to exploit knowledge spillover. The last row of the table displays the p value of the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residual; we do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation.
In columns (a) and ( On the contrary, in SMII the high appropriability of innovations, raising entry barriers, creates an oligopoly of innovators which tend to patent their innovations in order to enjoy the monopoly rent patent given them. They face a longer effective patent life (guaranteed by the absence of competition); therefore R&D investments are postponed just before the expected patent rent is due to expire. As just hypothesized, results in columns (b) and (d) show neither contemporary nor delayed (one and two lags) significant coefficients of Patent, justifying a longer effective patent life.
As a result, the persistence coefficient in this pattern is not significant. The strong significance of the initial condition confirms that, in SMII, the present investment in R&D is affected by the earlier one, strengthening the presumption of a relationship between patent and R&D deferred in time.
We expect a positive sign for ln(Sales): if a firm's size increases, investments in R&D may also increase; it is not significant in either of the patterns. The constant term is always positive and significant.
In columns (e) and (f) we have introduced another control for size: R&D size as a measure of the size of the R&D division. Its coefficient is negative and significant in both SMI and SMII and its sign means that the R&D productivity decreases when the relative size of the R&D division increases. This is due to the sunk costs: if the R&D division grows (in percentage), the per capita expenditure in R&D decreases. The magnitude of that coefficient is very low: an increase of 1% in the R&D size implies a decrease in the R&D productivity of 0.002% for firms in SMI and 0.001%
for firms in SMII. Patent coefficients do not change in either SMI or SMII, neither do the variables just expounded, but the magnitude of the contemporaneous coefficient of Patent in SMI (the only significant) reduces.
Generally, the R&D division of firms is made up of highly educated people. This is the reason why, in columns (g) and (h), we add the variable Education to control for the education levels in the R&D division. A positive correlation between R&D investment and the share of graduated R&D employees is presumed, because graduates receive higher wages than less educated people. As expected its sign is positive, but is significant only in SMI (column g): a unitary increase in the percentage of graduated employees implies an increase of 0.004% in the R&D expenses per employee in the R&D division. The reverse R&D-patents relationship remains robust to the introduction of this control variable; the contemporaneous coefficient of Patent in SMI continues to be highly significant and its magnitude slowly decreases when more significant regressors are introduced.
We may argue that investments in R&D are affected by the financial structure of a firm: if getting credit becomes more expensive, a firm will have less money to invest. In columns (i) and (l) we introduce a measure of a firms debt, Leverage. Firms use debt as a source of financing; when the leverage increases, a firm is considered more risky. Leverage is negative but not significant. As always, nothing changes in the patents-R&D relationship and persistence, and the significant contemporaneous coefficient of Patent in SMI continues to decrease.
We also control for a measure of efficiency, Labour cost (columns (m) and (n) in table 9). It is significant only in SMI with a negative sign: if labor cost decreases in every division (included R&D), the resources to be invested increase everywhere. This is because a more efficient firm may have a higher financial liquidity and, as a consequence, may invest more in R&D activities. In both patterns nothing changes in the sign and significance of all other regressors.
We performed two further robustnes checks. The first one concerns the estimation method. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) As said above, we cannot introduce more lags of patent applications because of the insufficient number of observations. For sure, this is a weakness of the present analysis, but we have tried to
give robustness to our hypotheses showing that, adding more control variables, the relationship between patent and R&D does not change. Moreover, the estimation of the reverse causality R&D-patents link on a more suitable sample can be the line of a future research.
Concluding remarks
The present work fits within two literatures: patents→R&D reverse causality relationship and innovation persistence. It makes advances in the empirical literature on the patents→R&D relationship because, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first that tests a R&D-patents Granger Given the many missing values of patent applications in the dataset, we cannot estimate more than two lags for Patent, therefore we cannot draw conclusions about the effective patent life in SMII.
The weakness of the present work may be the basis for a future research. 
Level of technological opportunities
These are all the instruments that firms use to protect the results of their innovative activities from imitation. Industries can be sorted by high and low appropriability conditions. High appropriability conditions refer to the ability firms have to successfully protect innovation from imitation (we are dealing with formal means, such as patents and trademarks, and informal means, such as process secrecy and knowledge
Appropriability conditions
Cumulativeness conditions
These conditions refer to the possibility that the innovative activity today is the starting point for innovative activity tomorrow, that is, firms which are willing to innovate today, are willing to innovate in the future (Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001 ).
External sources of opportunities
External sources of opportunities arise when firms are able to engage in interactions and co-operations with other agents in the innovation system. The economic environment which may offer a pool of advanced knowledge is made up of suppliers, users, competitors, private R&D labs, universities and other public research institutes (Laursen and Meliciani, 2002; Reichstein and Salter, 2006) . mining; textiles; clothing; leather and footwear; wood and related products; printing and publishing; non-metallic mineral products; fabricated metals; machinery and equipment; electrical; radio and TV; medical and optical; other transport equipment; furniture; recycling; construction; wholesale trade; land transport; auxiliary transport services; research and development; plastic material; water; car retails; car wholesale; insurance and supporting activities; real estate; public services; education. Schumpeter Mark II motor vehicles; food and beverages; pulp and paper; basic metals; sea transport; air transport; telecommunication; computing and software; other business services; coke and oil; chemicals; electric-powered and gas; retails; transport; financial activities; healthcare. -0.1895 (-0.48) Patent (-2) -0.0160 (-0.35) -0.0491 (-0.60) -0.0135 (-0.30) -0.0779 (-0.93) -0.0173 (-0.41) -0.0809 (-0.98) -0.0006 (-0.02) -0.0338 (-0.38) 0.0027 (0.07) -0.0356 (-0.39) ln(Sales) -0.0023 (-0.54) ln(R&D) 0 0.6922*** (6.66) 1.0193*** (7.22) 0.5863*** (4.00)
1.4801*** (6.55) 0.5622*** (3.77) 1.3936*** (6.27) 0.5232*** (3.03)
1.3957*** (6.32) 0.4874*** 
